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ABSTRACT
Purpose: Management is normally held accountable to stakeholders because it enters into long-term 
relationships with them.  However, managers which are planning on departing the organisation can 
take advantage of stakeholders’ trust for their own personal benefit.  This paper examines how 
accountability mechanisms can preserve organisation-stakeholder relationships in the face of high 
management turnover.
Design/methodology/approach: A case study of student-managed non-profit organisation in which 
the management team is replaced annually.  Representatives of all (internal and external) 
stakeholders are interviewed.
Findings: While stakeholders and management work towards mutually agreed upon objectives, at 
times they also work against each other and pursue their own self-interests.  The organisation has, 
however, been able to survive due to the introduction of accountability mechanisms. 
Originality/value: Drawing on stakeholder-agency theory, this paper shows how accountability 
mechanisms can preserve organisational memory and organisation-stakeholder relationships.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
Entré is a student-managed non-profit organisation, which promotes entrepreneurship through 
seminars and competitions at the University of Canterbury.  Entré also provides management 
experience to students, which is why its management team changes every year.  This presents a 
unique opportunity to study how an organisation survives and retains organisational knowledge 
from year to year.  Drawing on stakeholder-agency theory (Hill and Jones, 1992), this paper 
investigates how the annual turnover of management impacts organisation-stakeholder relationships 
and the role of accountability mechanisms in managing these relationships.  
Accountability is concerned with how agents account for their actions to stakeholders.  Rooted in 
accounting, ethics and governance, accountability encompasses corporate governance, management 
and internal control, and external auditing and reporting (Rasche and Esser, 2006; Solomon, 2007).  
There are different types of accountabilities at the different levels of an organisation and, 
consequently, different mechanisms for ensuring that agents appropriately fulfil their 
responsibilities.  At the management-level, managers need to comply with laws and societal norms, 
keep their promises to customers, suppliers, etc and implement the organisation’s strategy.  At the 
governance-level, directors need to monitor and collaborate with management to ensure that 
management’s duties are carried out.  Accountability mechanisms can be used to assist managers 
and directors discharge their duties. 
The governance, management and accounting literatures are awash with theories that explain how 
accountability mechanisms influence managerial behaviour.  Agency and stakeholder theories are 
the most prevalence (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004; Solomon, 2007).  Agency theory privileges 
shareholders’ interests over those of other stakeholders, and characterises management as self-
interested.  To maximise shareholder value, monitoring and incentive schemes are required to direct 
the behaviour of management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Stakeholder theory is not one theory, 
but a set of theories that recognise the interests of all stakeholders (e.g. customers, suppliers, 
employees, shareholders, etc) and explain how management can satisfy the competing interests of 
stakeholders.  Stakeholder-agency theory combines these two theories in order to explain the 
dynamic relationship between stakeholders and management.
In the non-profit sector, organisations do not have shareholders, but they do have multiple 
stakeholders such as government, donors, beneficiaries, and voluntary and paid employees. The 
behaviour of stakeholders and managers may be characterised by self-interest, sentiment, duty, or 
excellence (Rocha and Ghoshal, 2004).  It would be naïve to assume that managers in non-profit 
organisations are purely self-interested or other-interested (e.g. sentiment for beneficiaries or a duty 
to donors).  The role of the board of directors is to ensure that the mission of the non-profit 
organisation is fulfilled.  They may use accountability mechanisms (e.g. incentives and controls) to 
direct management’s attention and constrain self-interested behaviour.  Also, they may have to 
prioritise the competing interests of stakeholders.
Self-interested and other-interested behaviour are opposing positions.  Human behaviour is likely to 
vary between these opposing positions. In which case, accountability mechanisms serve multiple 
purposes.  Accountability mechanisms can provide information to stakeholders and managements, 
which these parties can use to facilitate cooperation and make mutually beneficial decisions
(Freeman, 1984).  Accountability mechanisms can also be a means of control that stakeholders use
to direct the actions of management (Hill and Jones, 1992).  Conceivably, management could use 
accountability mechanisms to manipulate stakeholders and serve their own interests.  Although
stakeholder-agency theory has received much attention in the literature, researchers have rarely 
used to frame their studies of non-profit organisations.  
Entré is a small non-profit organisation.  The main stakeholders include sponsors, the University of 
Canterbury, participants, a board of directors, an administrator and a management team.  Entré has a 
annual budget of approximately $110,000.  In financial terms, the sponsors and the University of 
Canterbury do not have much at stake.  This make Entré an ideal site to study people’s propensity to 
be self-interested or other-interested, and the role of accountability mechanisms in facilitating 
cooperation or controlling myopic behaviour.  The potential for myopic behaviour is compounded 
by the fact that Entré’s management, who are student-volunteers, are replaced every year.  
Therefore, a case study of Entré is undertaken to gain insight into how accountability mechanism 
influence organisation-stakeholder relationships. This research fills a gap in knowledge identified 
by Miller (2002), Alam (2006) and Shankman ( 1999). 
This research project contributes to the area of stakeholder-agency theory both practically and 
theoretically. It shows that the annual changeover of the executive has impacted the relationships 
with stakeholders over the years, with poor systems exacerbating the handover process. The 
stakeholders of the organisation have been identified, with a narrow view being taken by the 
management team and the Board. It has been shown that when stakeholders are included in the 
decision-making process their interests are able to be met. However, there is a conflict between the 
short-term goals of the stakeholders compared to the long-term goals of Entré.  Some stakeholders 
commented that it is only be a matter of time before the lack of a success story coming from the 
competitions becomes a dividing issue and stakeholders discontinue support.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: First, the literature review discusses agency and 
stakeholder theories as well as research in non-profit organisations; Second, the research method is 
described; Third, the findings are presented; Fourth, the practical and theoretical implications of the 
findings are discussed; Finally, conclusions and future research opportunities are considered.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Stakeholder-Agency Theory
Agency theory has been widely applied over the decades to explain governance and management
practices and actions. It describes the relationship between the principal and agent, predicts that 
incentives and controls are needed to curb the agent’s opportunistic behaviour and align the 
interests of the agent with those of the principal. While not as popular as agency theory in 
organisation studies, stakeholder theory has been given much attention over the last two decades,
owing its intellectual development to Freeman’s (1984) seminal work Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach. It describes that the manager is the centre of the contractual relationship 
between the organisation and its stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992). Miller-Millesen (2003) argues
that agency theory is applicable to non-profit organisations, and Freeman et al. (2004) argues that 
stakeholder theory is applicable to for-profit organisations.
While agency theory assumes a single fiduciary role to the organisation’s shareholders, stakeholder 
theory proposes managers should promote multi-fiduciary roles to protect the interest of all 
stakeholders at large. Alam (2006) suggests this can be achieved through creating accountability 
mechanisms which encourage stakeholder commitment and reconcile the differences between these 
competing stakeholders. Furthermore, he believes that improving managers’ accountability to all 
stakeholders will assist in preventing myopic and fraudulent behaviour.  For example, managers at 
Enron and WorldCom were not adequately accountable to their stakeholders; they focused too 
heavily on improving short-term earnings, rather than long-term stakeholder value. The differences 
between agency and stakeholder theory are presented below (see table 1). 
Dimension Agency Theory Stakeholder Theory
Unit of analysis Contract Interests/relationships
Direction of relationship One-way Two-way
Normative basis of relationship Economic Principled moral reasoning
Criteria for organisational 
effectiveness
Efficiency Fairness
Role of resources Information only Important for survival
Relationships of individuals Goal conflict/divergent Contingent
Primary relationship Owner-manager All stakeholders (ranked)
Assumption of human 
behaviour
Bounded rationality
Rise aversion
Opportunistic
Adverse selection
Bounded rationality
Risk aversion
Contingent
Scope of responsibilities Economic Economic and social
Overriding principle Maximise firm NPV
Minimise agency costs
Equilibrium of interests
Implication for practise Align interests of employees 
and owners; take actions 
insofar as they maximise firm 
NPV; use efficient contracting 
mechanisms to minimise 
agency costs.
Balance in equilibrium the 
interests or claims of all 
relevant stakeholders.
Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Agency and Stakeholder Theory
There have been many debates on the theoretical and empirical validity of agency and stakeholder 
theory (e.g. Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004; Freeman et al., 2004).  It is not clear if either side can win 
the debate.  Drawing on Hill and Jones’ (1992) stakeholder-agency theory, this research takes the 
position that the most insight into organisational phenomena can be gained by combining both 
theories.  Instead of testing opposing hypotheses generated from agency and stakeholder theory, this 
research uses stakeholder-agency theory as a lens to understand and explain how accountability 
mechanisms influence organisation-stakeholder relationships. While the objective of non-profit 
organisations is to fairly balance all stakeholders’ interests, and this intuitively fits with stakeholder 
theory, self-interested behaviour is still possible.  
For example, Miller (2002) observes board members in a naturalistic setting and examines how a 
number of boards monitor their respective non-profit organisation. She finds that boards expect goal 
alignment between the executives and the organisation at large, and opportunistic behaviour to be 
non-existent. She suggests future research may seek to find why boards neglect their monitoring 
role, even after scandals, and defer to the chief executive for important decision making.  
While this research draws on stakeholder-agency theory, it is relatively under-theorised in terms of 
non-profit organisations.  The following section reviews the different branches of stakeholder 
theory to gain additional insight into how the board and management of non-profit organisation 
manage stakeholder relationships. 
2.1.1. Models of Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theory is timely yet adolescent, controversial yet important, with five major themes 
developed in the field (Laplume et al., 2008). These are the definition and salience of stakeholders, 
stakeholder actions and responses, firm actions and responses, firm performance, and theory 
debates. Several different versions of stakeholder theory exist (Alam, 2006), including the 
Stakeholder Strategic Management Matrix Model (Freeman, 1984), the Stakeholder-Agency Theory 
(Hill and Jones, 1992), the Feminist Stakeholder Theory (Burton and Dunn, 1996) and the 
Stakeholder Salience Model (Mitchell et al., 1997). These models explain different aspects of 
organisation-stakeholder relationships (see table 2). 
Stakeholder Models Promoters Features
Stakeholder Strategic 
Management Matrix 
Model
Freeman (1984) Stakeholder management on the basis of a four 
cell Matrix. Stakeholders are prioritised on the 
basis of co-operation and their relative 
competitive threats.
Stakeholder-Agency 
Theory
Hill and Jones (1992) Managers have agency responsibility to all 
major stakeholders, not just shareholders. 
Acknowledges power differences between 
different stakeholders.
Feminist Stakeholder 
Theory
Burton and Dunn (1996) Stakeholder management on the basis of 
relationship, quality, care, and need.
Stakeholder Salience 
Model
Mitchell et al. (1997) Stakeholder prioritisation on the basis of 
legitimacy, power and urgency.
Table 2: Models of Stakeholder Theory (Alam, 2006, p.211)
Aside from feminist stakeholder theory, all of these can be categorised within the instrumental 
branch of stakeholder theory. These theories focus on strategies to manage stakeholders for 
attaining organisational objectives (Alam, 2006). The instrumental branch of stakeholder theory
assumes that the role of management is to achieve a balance between the interests of all 
stakeholders (Shankman, 1999). Maintaining an appropriate balance between the interests of all 
stakeholder groups is the only way to ensure survival of the firm and to attain organisational goals. 
Stakeholder-agency theory suggests that in satisfying claims made by stakeholders, the amount of 
resources available to managers to increase growth through diversification is diminished. Thus,
stakeholders must gather more information about management activities, but this can be costly (Hill 
and Jones, 1992). Stakeholder-agency theory takes into account the general aspects of the other 
stakeholder theories, and is discussed in greater detail below.
2.1.2. Stakeholder Identity
Stakeholders are parties who have a legitimate claim on the organisation, established through the 
existence of an exchange relationship. Freeman (1984, p.46) defines stakeholders as “any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives”, but 
this definition has been met with mixed reviews. Goodpaster (1991) argued that this set of criteria 
implies two types of stakeholders: strategic and moral. These relate to those stakeholders that can 
affect the firm, and those stakeholders that are affected by the firm, respectively. Freeman’s 
definition has been criticized on the basis that the “can affect” umbrella encompasses too many 
possibilities causing the term stakeholder to lose much practical significance (Laplume, et al. 2008). 
All-inclusive definitions include any entity maintaining an interest or even remotely being affected 
by the firm (Freeman, 1984; Phillips et al., 2003); whereas narrow views only recognise 
stakeholders whose relationship with the firm is primarily economic (Friedman, 1970) or those that 
are able to yield power over firms (Frooman, 1999). In between these extremes, others define
stakeholders as those groups or individuals who assume some degree of risk bearing activity with 
the firm, something to gain or to lose from the turn of events (Clarkson, 1995; Cragg and
Greenbaum, 2002). This establishes a group of stakeholders as those whose relationship to the firm 
is non-economic, but does not go as far as to include all members of society (Clarkson, 1995).
2.1.3. Prioritising
Once an organisation’s stakeholders have been identified, their expectations are prioritised. 
Although many may agree that satisfying the demands of stakeholders is beneficial, it is unrealistic 
to assume total stakeholder satisfaction. Distinctions between stakeholders have been identified by 
virtue of their importance to the survival of the firm (Shankman, 1999). Post et al. (2002) propose a 
typology to address resource-based, industry structure-based, and socio-political-based stakeholders 
separately. Freeman (1984) prioritises stakeholder on the basis of co-operation and their relative 
competitive threats. As managers have agency responsibility to all major stakeholders, ranking 
stakeholders appears a logical method, identifying priorities with key dimensions such as power, 
legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997). From these suggested dimensions, Parent and 
Deephouse (2007) found that power has the most effect on salience, followed by urgency and then 
finally legitimacy in their case study of two large scale sporting event organising committees. 
However, Driscoll and Starik (2004) challenged the comprehensiveness of Mitchell et al.’s 
dimensions and argued that the natural environment should be seen as the primordial and primary 
stakeholder of all firms.
2.1.4. Stakeholder actions and responses
How these stakeholders actually monitor and influence the organisation is an area still debated. 
Frooman (1999) develops a classification of stakeholder influence strategies. He argues that 
stakeholders use direct strategies when the organisation depends on them for resources, and indirect 
strategies, for example vicariously influencing actions, when it does not. As mentioned above, a 
popular theory is that stakeholder influence is determined by the power and legitimacy of the 
stakeholder. Therefore, stakeholder groups may use indirect strategies, such as coalitions (Neville 
and Menguc, 2006) to combine their power and legitimacy in a way that enhances their bargaining 
position. Friedman and Miles (2002) argue that influence depends on relational structures, 
contractual forms, and institutional support. 
2.1.5. Firm actions and responses 
How firms balance the various interests of stakeholders also needs to be addressed. Freeman (1984) 
suggests that the role of management is to balance the interests of stakeholders over time, but critics 
argue that the theory provides no basis for deciding between competing stakeholder interests (Kaler, 
2006). Hosseini and Brenner (1992) proposed using sophisticated analytical techniques to calculate 
a consistent weighting scheme to balance these decisions, but accomplishing such a feat in the 
fluctuating business world with ever changing variables and non-rational stakeholders seems 
questionable. Stakeholder representatives’ involvement in the managerial decision process has been 
argued to balance the competing interests (Burton and Dunn, 1996), as well as being directly 
included in mediation to more effectively resolve disputes (Lampe, 2001). Furthermore, Reynolds 
et al. (2006) conclude from their study that balancing interests across decisions (instead of within 
decisions) tends to generate more instrumental value and is also seen as more ethical.
2.2. Non-profit research
2.2.1. Management turnover
Researching the problems faced by a UK children’s centre, Mordaunt and Dixon (2005) observe 
and interview the members of a non-profit board and the key members of staff about their views 
and reactions as their organisation dealt with a crisis that threatened its continued existence. Facing 
problems with high-turnover, it was found that board members often spent the first year coming to 
terms with working and coping with a small child, on top of the membership of the board. A board 
member in their study commented, ‘It takes a year to understand your role so, by the time you do -
it’s nearly time to move on’ (p.6). Problems included ignorance, issues about continuity, formulaic 
conformance to previous years’ work, accountability and reporting lines, poor communication, the 
intermingling of board and consumer roles, adhocracy and neglecting the entity as an organisation.
The ever changing business environment creates a situation of permanent disequilibrium and
persistent power differentials between stakeholders and managers (Hill and Jones, 1992). While 
change at one point in time may favour managers, change in a subsequent period may shift the 
balance of power towards other stakeholder groups. 
2.2.2. Governance and accountability
The question remains, however, as to how stakeholders hold their respective organisation 
responsible for their actions and use of resources. Accountability implies a liability to explain to 
someone else, who has authority to assess the account, and allocate praise or censure (Jones, 1977).  
Katz (2008) argues that the board’s commitment is crucial in moving forward in non-profit 
organisations. McClusky (2002) proposes a conceptual framework for re-examining any non-profit 
organisation’s governance, particularly focussing upon the roles and responsibilities of boards, 
executives, and other staff and volunteers. It is suggested that several factors are important,
including the number of active volunteers and the breadth of roles they perform and the level of 
trust and confidence between the chief executive and the board. Furthermore, executive transition 
and environmental factors, such as a fundamental change in funding sources, are incorporated. 
Werhane and Freeman (1997) identified interest-based, right-based and duty-based reasons for 
stakeholder accountability. The interest-based approach looks at consequences of organisational 
dealings to the stakeholders, the right-based viewpoint concentrates upon the equal distribution of 
resources and opportunities, and the duty-based analysis encompasses organisational 
responsibilities to stakeholders. One key aspect raised by Alam (2006) is that as the nature of the 
stakeholder relationships alter as time passes, the management of the organisation must reassess 
stakeholder needs and conform to these changes.
3. RESEARCH METHOD
This research uses the case study method.  The qualitative methods often associated with case 
studies lend themselves to this research with unstructured interviews and an active-participant 
observation generating detailed information about the organisation. One organisation, Entré, is 
studied in its own right using an idiographic approach. The researchers have taken a positivist 
perspective.  The stakeholder relationships and the impact on these by the changeover in 
management exist independently (Bryman and Bell, 2007), and the data below truly measures and 
depicts the reality of the situation (Weber, 2004). The research results will be able to be reproduced
with the caveat that due to Entré’s unique circumstances this will be difficult. Stakeholder-agency 
theory provides the theoretical framework for this research.
3.1. The Research Site
Entré was chosen as the research site for the following reasons. First, researchers have called for 
further research into non-profit boards from a stakeholder perspective (Miller, 2002; Alam, 2006; 
Shankman, 1999). Second, as Entré’s management are student-volunteers and they are replaced 
every year, this presents a unique opportunity to contribute to the literature. Third, one of the 
researchers had experienced the difficulties first hand related to the operations of the organisation 
and its relationships with stakeholders, as CFO of Entré in 2009.
3.2. Research Questions
This research project will fulfil many calls in the literature for future research in the area of 
stakeholder theory. Alam (2006) asserts that accounting research from stakeholder perspectives is 
still at an early stage and more work needs to be done before a well balanced reporting and 
accountability structure can be introduced. Among his seven areas for further research, two are most 
related to this research project: First, research on how organisations identify their stakeholders; and 
second, research on how an organisation designs their organisational processes of measurement and 
reporting in relation to stakeholder management and concerns. Further, Miller (2002) suggests 
future research may seek to find why boards neglect their monitoring role, even after scandals, and 
defer to the chief executive for important decision making.
This research investigates whether stakeholders with large financial interests in Entré use 
accountability mechanisms to monitor management. Also, this research examines how the 
organisation retains knowledge, particularly of stakeholders’ expectations, as the entire 
management team is changed every year. This relates to the problems faced by Entré as the 
management team spend under one year at their post, and then often leave the city creating a 
knowledge vacuum. The effects that this has on the organisation at large and its relationships with 
stakeholders, particularly sponsors and the University of Canterbury are areas that this research 
studies. Notably, global recession has lead to decreasing charitable contributions to non-profits
(Katz, 2008). Entré faces these concerns as several of their major sponsors withdrew their support at 
the beginning of the year and some of the remaining sponsors reduced their contributions. 
Therefore, the research questions are as follows: 
1. Who are Entré’s stakeholders and what are their expectations? 
2. What accountability mechanisms have stakeholders and the board of directors 
used to monitor management?
3. How does the annual change in management influence organisation-stakeholder 
relationships?
4. What are the management team’s expectations?
5. How does the management team manage stakeholder expectations and the annual 
change process?
3.3. Data Collection
Three sources are used to collect the research data, similar to the approach undertaken by Scalzo 
(2006). Individual interviews with key stakeholders of the organisation, an active-participant 
observation, and a review of archival documentation related to assisting the new team transitioning 
into power and specific accounting information utilised, enables triangulation and contributes to the 
trustworthiness of the research. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with members of each 
group of identifiable stakeholders as set out in the table below. The selection of which stakeholders 
in each group to interview was made by a combination of their importance to the firm and the 
ability to gain access to them within the research time-frame (see table 3).
Participants 4
Team members 4
Future Team members 2
Former Team members 2
Administrator 1
Sponsors 3
Board member 1
Former Board member 1
Total 18
Table 3: Interviewees
An analysis of archival documents was undertaken, with both hard-copy and soft-copy documents 
examined. The lack of archival documentation will be discussed in the findings. Finally, the 
researcher’s own interactions and dealings with the organisation were taken into account where 
pertinent to the research.
4. FINDINGS
4.1. Background
Entré was officially incorporated on 18 April, 2005. Still considered in its infancy, the organisation 
is loosely based upon a similar entity operating out of another university in New Zealand. Entré is a 
non-profit company run by students at the University of Canterbury. The goal of Entré to foster the 
entrepreneurial spirit on campus, to encourage innovation and educate students on the basic 
elements of business development. Entré runs free competitions and events for students throughout 
the year to realise this goal, culminating in over $85,000 worth of prizes in goods and 
services. Entré also hosts FastTrack, a series of business seminars designed to cover the basic 
knowledge essential to an entrepreneur. These are presented by industry experts, and each seminar 
provides relevant and practical knowledge for students endeavouring to enter the business world.
Entré has an annual turnover of around $110,000, with a detail of its typical yearly events outlined 
at the end of this section.  Each year Entré welcomes a new group of students in to run the 
operations of the business. Whilst bringing in fresh ideas and an enthusiastic attitude, similar 
mistakes have been made year-on-year, which has prompted the organisation to seek continuity by 
recruiting an ongoing administrator at the end of 2008.
Apart from those present at sponsorship negotiations – who have first-hand knowledge of what was 
promised and agreed – there is little understanding on the subject. This is exacerbated by the fact 
that the contracts are compiled by a further external party, often containing factual mistakes of the 
parties’ agreements. Sponsors give monetary donations within three categories; Platinum ($20,000), 
Gold ($7,500) and Silver ($3,500). Other than that, there are gifts, subsidised prices and in-kind 
benefits such as judging and mentoring which sponsors donate. In return, other than recognition, 
Sponsors Breakfasts, access to the Advisory Committee (for certain levels) and invitations to 
events, what the sponsors actually wish to receive and what they accomplish in reality will be 
discussed in later sections. Entré’s reporting structure (see figure 1) is shown below.
Figure 1: Reporting Structure
4.2. Management Training and Changeover Procedures
One repeated theme emerging from the interviews relates to the difficulties faced by the team in 
regards to having poor handover procedures. With similar mistakes being made year-on-year, the 
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lack of systems in place has been a real hindrance. This is highlighted by the new administrator’s 
comments on handover procedures:
“I think the problem has been that each year the teams try to reinvent the wheel… And so 
they end up making the same mistakes again.” (Administrator)
The Entré management team utilises a ‘shared-drive’, an electronic source of information 
supposedly updated each year by successive teams. It is envisaged to contain a wealth of 
information such as invite lists, reports, budgets, and minutes. However, the documentation is 
sparse and incomplete, as shown by various team members’ experiences retrieving information:
“One of my personal favourites was opening a report from a past CEO… …on the next page 
it had ‘to be completed’. So there wasn’t really information.” (Team member 1)
To combat this, new systems were put in place this year. The most significant change was 
employing an administrator. Each team member was given a USB memory device to store their own 
personal information, which were then routinely recollected by the administrator and used to update 
the main shared-drive, making it possible for every team member to see what the others were doing.
A few hard copy documents were available were compiled, as well as background discussions with 
those who had had experience with Entré, but may have only personally retained their experiences 
involved thereto.
Next year’s management team believes that they will be better placed in terms of retaining 
organisational knowledge, as Future team member 2 stated, “Yeah, I’ve been given a flash drive 
with everything from this year, so I’ll be looking through that and handing it out to each person in 
the team.” Although time, effort and importance have been placed upon ensuring adequate 
handover systems, there is a belief that next year will probably not use or need the information. 
4.3. Impact of Management Turnover on Organisation-Stakeholder Relationships
The lack of systems and annual team changeover impacts the relationships that Entré has with its 
stakeholders significantly. As the administrator stated, “Each year the CEO will say to [the 
sponsors that] they have problems X, Y and Z and they said that they hear it… every year.” The 
sponsors that have had longer relationships find it a difficult aspect to be dealing with an effectively 
new entity each year, as Sponsor 1 argued, “Well effectively it’s a new business every year… and I 
suppose that is one of the challenges… In a normal business you don’t get a new CEO every year, 
you write a strategy and it would be three or four years before you need to revise it.” This results in 
each new team having to convince sponsors that have been there from the beginning that it is still 
worthwhile dealing with Entré, and that the new team will not change what was their original 
interest in the firm. Sponsors have to decide each year whether the goals and mission of the entity 
are aligned with their own, as this is not passed from year to year. 
As Entré is still early in its development, some stakeholders feel that it is simply too early to 
determine if Entré will generate any longer-term benefits. This trade off between long-term versus 
short-term is repeated throughout the interview process, as Sponsor 2 commented, “So for us it’s 
almost too early to tell, the result of last year’s one… it might go forward, so that could be a future 
success story, but for us it’s too early to take a stock take on expectations.”
4.4. The Role of the Board of Directors
Entré’s board of directors has not shown complete interest in being involved in the organisation, as 
the administrator commented, “they have had to overcome a very dysfunctional board at the start of 
the year, a board that wasn’t very involved and provided no governance and no guidance for the 
senior management of the team.” The fact that the Board may not be involved with Entré for 
personally motivating reasons, there are not any directors’ fees paid and it is not overly career 
enhancing is significant, as highlighted by one board member’s reasons for getting involved: “I was 
a director of Canterprise, and as you know Entré is a wholly owned subsidiary of Canterprise,…so 
I drew the short straw basically.” This issue appears to have been kept under wraps for some time, 
with possibly no one wanting to admit, nor to address the problem. By the time this research project 
was carried out, there were three Board members of Entré, two of which have been appointed this 
year. As Team member 1 said, “When I told [the Deputy Vice Chancellor] that we had no Board 
and we were liable for the budget as it wasn’t getting signed off, he was titchy. But once the truth 
was out, I was able to get help.”
4.5. Stakeholders: Definition and Salience
Entré appears to have an easily identifiable group of stakeholders. As a small entity, the number of 
other firms and individuals it affects is limited. As mentioned earlier, apart from the University 
students involved, the management team, the Board, sponsors and the University at large, there are 
minimal other groups with anything at risk, a suggested criteria by Clarkson (1995) and Cragg and
Greenbaum (2002). Entré’s Board acknowledges these stakeholders and their accountability to 
them, “Well you’ve heard the cliché stakeholders, it has several stakeholders. So it is accountable 
to them all really, in different ways and to different degrees.”
Entré has a scale for ranking the salience of its sponsors with Platinum Sponsors donating the most 
money and thus are given the most attention. However this is not always the case, as reflected in the 
CEO’s comments on the involvement of the sponsors:
“[One smaller sponsor is] new this year and they are massively involve… Whereas [other, 
larger ones] never return emails and don’t turn up to meetings.” (Team member 1)
Overall the stakeholder group of sponsors does not seem to be too demanding, as one team member 
reflected, “Not many of them are hugely concerned with operations, most of them are only 
concerned with what they get out of it.” There is also no apparent accountability for their actions 
towards Entré, with one team member admitting “I certainly wouldn’t report back to their bosses 
that they aren’t involved”, though this is an aspect for their own stakeholder accountability.
4.6. Stakeholder Expectations and Accountability Mechanisms
4.6.1. Direct Strategies
The University maintains direct legal influence over Entré through its charter, ensuring it is in 
keeping with the direction that it wants Entré to be taking:
Section 2.1 University and Canterprise Benefits
The company shall carry on any business or activity, for the purpose of advancement of 
education or educational activities, for the sole benefit of the University and/or Canterprise 
and not for the private and pecuniary profit of any individuals.
Some stakeholders are bound themselves to be quite critical of how Entré operates because of their 
own mandates, especially those distributing government funding. This does show interesting 
evidence of withholding resources from Entré, dependent upon reports throughout the year:
“We pay our sponsorship back to you on a pre-agreed schedule of payments, and we 
withhold the last payment based on receiving a final report of how you’ve gone for that full 
calendar and financial year, and then you get the last amount of sponsorship.” (Sponsor 2)
The most common direct strategy used against Entré is the sponsorship renewal. What the sponsors 
expect from Entré is kept at the forefront. However, there is a conflict between short-term benefits 
for sponsors and long-term benefits for Entré. Sponsors are keen for immediate returns for their 
sponsorship dollars, whereas Entré arguably produces long-term benefits in terms of experience for 
the team members and participants. This is shown by the following quotes of what one sponsor 
ideally wishes to see out of Entré, and how that has not been met yet:
“…I know it’s a long road for some of these businesses, but it’s been going for four or five 
years now, we would have thought some of those might have been coming to fruition and 
wanting more accounting or taxation work by now.” (Sponsor 1)
Some sponsors determine how their sponsorship money is used. For example, one stakeholder
includes as part of their sponsorship package a ‘Sponsors Breakfast’, increasing their networking 
opportunities. There is also evidence of some stakeholders attempting to directly influence Entré’s
overall mission and goals, to ensure alignment. One sponsor is quoted as follows regarding the shift 
in Entré’s focus from successful teams to the education and encouragement of entrepreneurship in 
general:
“Those are very different aims, and the focus this year and hopefully subsequent years is 
more about encouraging entrepreneurship and hopefully getting students good experience, 
rather than trying to necessarily commercialise things.”
4.6.2. Indirect Strategies
Many stakeholders are just happy to be kept informed, and it seems there has to be something very 
drastic before they would say something. They will give advice and impart influence through the 
Advisory committee, but not commit any formal actions towards directing Entré, as evident through 
a future team member’s experience of informing stakeholders of future directions, “We sort of said 
how we were heading, and they suggested things that we could do… They weren’t forceful saying 
‘you need to do this’”
There seems minimal accountability in terms of the actual operations of Entré and its day-to-day 
expenditure. Furthermore, the interest levels and responsiveness of some stakeholders is not as high 
as that of the actual team, creating a relatively pacified situation:
“The financial statements aren’t too much of a concern, they’re nice to have to know where 
the money is being spent… But other than that, we’re probably the ones who are less 
responsive than the Entré committee at times.” (Sponsor 1)
Some stakeholders realise that Entré is important to the University, so instead of directly trying to 
influence the organisation they go through the upper echelons of the University should they have 
any concerns or issues regarding Entré and its operations. This may be due to the fact that the 
University holds a longer relationship with the stakeholders than the team does itself, represented 
by one team member’s experiences, “I do know that complaints go to [the Deputy Vice 
Chancellor]… They just go to the top person.”
4.6.3. Stakeholder Interest
Many stakeholders are merely happy to ‘donate’ money to the cause, with no real follow up nor 
interest in how that money gets utilised, obviously apart from being convinced it’s a good idea the 
next year, as the administrator noted, “I think some of them are quite content to give their money 
and come along to the events and that’s what they want their involvement to be.” Other 
stakeholders, particularly the students, seem to have ideas on how to improve and influence Entré,
but with no method of doing so and no long-term reason to chase it up:
“I think it would have been good to have some sort of live document that if you changed, 
would show it straight away… it was a bit confusing getting different documents so I guess 
that could have been improved a little bit.” (Participant 2)
4.7. How Entré Resists Stakeholder Pressure
Some stakeholders, whilst may not be completely agreeing with how their interests are being 
addressed, realise it is a learning curve for the team and thus have lower expectations. One sponsor 
expressed the view that “Well I think it’s almost too early to tell yet, because the programme is in 
its infancy, we understand that.” As Entré continues to operate, this learning curve excuse may not 
last, with one team member suggested “They were happy to let things slide because Entré was in 
sort of foundation years, but as things go on, they will be more like ‘if you want our money, give us
some returns’.
Because of Entré’s importance to the University, the organisation is able to resist stakeholder 
pressure because of the relationships the stakeholders want to keep with the University themselves, 
and the fact ready replacements may step into their place should they depart, one sponsor admitting 
“I think it would be easy [to part ways], but I’m sure someone would jump into that hole just as 
quick and we don’t want that… [they] would jump at the chance to get their name out there and be 
in with the University.”
Moreover, Entré is able to resist stakeholder pressure as there is no binding pressure, illustrated by a 
team member’s comments that “Because its an Advisory committee there was no binding authority, 
so sometimes I’d listen and sometimes I wouldn’t.”
4.8. Benefits which Stakeholders Receive
The various stakeholders will naturally have varying interests to be satisfied, luckily for Entré it 
seems that these all coincide with each other, the experience of running a business, the access to 
entrepreneurial expertise and competitions, and encouraging successful businesses and 
entrepreneurs are inclusively aligned aims. As one sponsor put it, “It’s three pronged, there’s the 
students, the University, and the entrants as well.”
4.8.1. Access to Teams
Entré can be seen as a vessel for starting relationships with future stars, whilst many stakeholders 
offer their time to assist teams in competitions and to share their expertise during seminars, there is 
the ulterior motive of getting their name in and amongst the students, as joking remarks were made 
to entrants such as “‘if you need some money down the track, don’t be afraid to give me a call’”
and there was a general acceptance that “I think it’s in their own interest as well to go and meet 
with teams so the teams know about what sort of companies there are around that can help them 
once they get their business started.” This was also evident from certain stakeholder’s remarks 
regarding ongoing relationships with those students that had been through the Entré experience:
“We’ve got students who have entered Entré doing projects for us, and some for the 
University, with commercialisation projects.” (Sponsor 3)
4.8.2. Media Exposure
Of course for many stakeholders, particularly those donating money, there is the desire for positive 
exposure and recognition for their efforts. “It’s also from a PR point of view, because [our 
organisation] likes to be associated with successful things, and if we’ve made a contribution we like 
that to be acknowledged” said one sponsor. However, there is some dissatisfaction with the amount 
of exposure involved considering the amounts of monetary and in-kind sponsorship given to the 
organisation, “it doesn’t really get a lot of media exposure, you might need to get The Press or 
someone on board as a sponsor, not even necessarily giving cash, maybe just an article or two 
throughout the year. That would be useful.” This need to ensure that real, tangible benefits are 
received by stakeholders is possibly best phrased by a former board member as follows:
“I think they would like it if someone stood up or was getting written about in the Business 
Review…”
4.8.3. Relationship with University
As touched on earlier, some stakeholders utilise Entré’s importance to the University to foster their 
own relationship, with the University being one of the largest organisations in Christchurch. One 
sponsor reflected upon reasons for being involved, “Well there are two reasons, to keep building a 
profile within the University and trying to ideally win some work out of the University in terms of 
accounting work and audit work.” Furthermore, the same sponsor went on to speculate this may be 
quite a common goal amongst other sponsors “They won’t be student focused but business focused, 
they would be more about getting a relationship with the University, that will be their key.”
Ultimately, many of the stakeholder goals are short term, but Entré may not be suited to supplying 
these type of results, with the experiences gained possibly the most valuable outcome of the courses 
involved. As one sponsor put it, “There is an old saying that it takes 15 years to become an 
overnight success” meaning that some benefits will not be evident for a long time, creating issues 
for satisfying and balancing stakeholder interests in the here and now.
4.9. Stakeholders Expectations and Management’s Intentions 
Interestingly, the incoming team does not completely understand what they are getting into with 
Entré, so it is difficult for them to meet and balance stakeholder interests when their own are not 
met:
“I thought it would be good and I’d have quite a lot of contact with the sponsors, …Yeah, 
what I ended up doing was very different from what my expectations were…” (Team 
member 3)
Some jobs which were expected to be done were not, creating difficulties for this year’s team in 
their dealings with other stakeholders. For example, some sponsorship was meant to have been 
taken care of by the outgoing team, but as a team member stated, she was left to do it herself which 
was less than ideal as it was left too late: “In some minutes it says that [last year’s CEO] was to 
organise the sponsorship for this year, like it was an actual directive but never followed.”
Quite a focus of Entré seems to be on one stakeholder group, the students. One future team member 
spoke of next year’s direction “At the moment its focussed on becoming the leader of start-ups in 
New Zealand and we felt that’s sort of a bit unachievable to do that, so it’s now changed to more of 
a focus on education.” Moreover, other stakeholders’ needs may not be realised for a number of 
years, with the long-term gains not meeting the short-term expectations or desires. Although 
sponsors may want overnight successful businesses to pin their name against and receive business 
from, a Board member suggests that this may not be achievable:
“For me the ultimate success story will be 10 years down the track, the ex members of Entré 
are all tallied up and the list reads that so and so is managing this big company… that will 
be the ultimate measure of success. It won’t be any one specific business that succeeds.”
The management team have their own personal agendas, which may or may not assist in the 
running of Entré and the firm’s needs to meet stakeholder interests. Above seeking positive 
experiences for a C.V., some team members actively seek employment directly from stakeholders, 
“… to try and meet some employers and sort of get a job out of one of them at the end of it.”
Ultimately, however, the goal is to make sure that Entré continues to operate, while perhaps 
stakeholders are seen as supplementary to that goal. Their interests in operations were realised to be 
somewhat easy to fulfil, with the task of keeping the organisation running regardless at the forefront 
of this year’s planning by a team member: “At the end of the year I realised the sponsors were 
happy, and it wasn’t because the events were tailored to them, it was what I did behind the 
scenes…”
5. DISCUSSION
5.1. Practical Implications
Going forward, Entré has recognised similar beneficial practices as identified by Scalzo (2006). His 
results indicated that the organization followed three key management practices throughout the 
entire change process: ongoing communications, senior management commitment, and planning. 
Entré has seen the commitment of the Board, with the University getting more behind the 
organisation and implementing the introduction of an administrator. Furthermore, the increased 
importance placed on each management team planning for future years, particularly in regards to 
sponsorship, as well as the introduction of personalised USB memory drives to retain individuals’ 
experiences and documentation are expected to be influential in managing the change process.
In terms of the management turnover, Mordaunt and Dixon’s (2005) discovery of ‘it [taking] a year 
to understand your role so, by the time you do - it’s nearly time to move on’ (p.6) also seems 
directly comparable. The team leaves their management responsibilities with a better understanding 
of the organisation and a general consensus of a view to doing things differently once they had 
learnt all they had. The fact that many of the Entré management team utilise their time involved as a 
way to add to their C.V. and possible employment opportunities with stakeholders means that their 
actions will be aligned and aimed at fulfilling stakeholder expectations.
The findings also support McClusky’s (2002) conceptual framework for re-examining non-profit
governance. He suggest that the critical factors for non-profit governance are: the number of active 
volunteers and the breadth of roles they perform, the level of trust and confidence between the chief 
executive and the board, executive transition, and environmental factors such as a fundamental 
change in funding sources. There has been unique trust and confidence issues between the 
management team and the Board. The Board tended to trust the management team to effectively 
carrying out their objectives as they did not utilise monitoring or controlling functions. Meanwhile, 
the executive team found it difficult achieve their objectives with limited mentoring from the 
Board. With the University becoming more involved and the inclusion of new Board members, this 
is expected to be rectified.
In terms of ranking the stakeholders, it seems that Entré is fortunate in having a closely aligned 
group with similar objectives in mind, with no one interest excluding another. Mitchell’s et al.
(1997) factors of power, legitimacy and urgency, and consequently Parent and Deephouse (2007), 
do not seem to extend naturally to Entré. Often the most powerful stakeholders are the least 
demanding as they are perhaps the busiest. Stakeholder demands depend on the stakeholder’s 
representative and their personal traits and interests, as shown by larger sponsors’ representatives 
taking longer to get back to Entré, and newer smaller ones being more involved in decisions and 
events.
There is a significant difference between the short-term goals of the stakeholders, and the long-
term benefits that Entré generates. The experiences provided to the participants of the competitions 
and seminar series as well as the management team may not be evident for a number of years.  
Further, overnight success stories in terms of start-up businesses are rare at best.  This results in a 
tension of explaining to and convincing stakeholders of Entré’s worthiness of support now.  
Stakeholders can desire short-term benefits, but Entré exists to provide long-term benefits. Some 
questions have been asked as to why there has not been any short-term success story. Entré’s 
management team, to some extent, have no real influence on the quality of the entrants and their 
business ideas and proposals. Apart from ensuring the education they provide is as good as possible, 
Entré may not be able to deliver the results some stakeholders’ desire in terms of successful 
businesses.
5.2. Theoretical Implications
Overall, Entré appears to conform with most currently recognised stakeholder literature in terms of 
identifying stakeholders. The all-inclusive conceptualisations incorporating any entity maintaining 
an interest or even remotely being affected by the firm, no matter how powerless (Freeman, 1984; 
Phillips et al., 2003) may be able to be utilised due to the limited areas Entré operates within and 
the number of those related to the firm. However, the University staff, student body, and 
Christchurch business community were barely mentioned, and Christchurch and New Zealand
citizens were not mentioned at all. Furthermore, the environment or anything beyond are not 
considered. Entré’s Board and management focus purely on sponsors, the University’s Vice 
Chancellor and Deputy Vice Chancellor, and student participants, which is a fairly narrow 
definition of stakeholders, as in Laplume, et al. (2008) and Phillips and Reichart (2000).
Strategies used by the stakeholders to influence Entré are consistent with Frooman’s (1999) 
classification of stakeholder influence strategies, with direct and indirect strategies evident. 
However, those stakeholders that may have aspirations to influence the organisation, however are 
not in a position to, namely the students. The Advisory committee could be argued to be a coalition 
to combine power and legitimacy in a way that enhances their bargaining position (Neville and
Menguc, 2006). Although the committee has no binding authority, it does have substantial influence 
over the management team in terms of mentoring and business experience. Furthermore, by
inducing stakeholder representatives’ involvement in the managerial decision process, any 
competing interests are balanced as alternate viewpoints are heard and discussed by the group 
(Burton and Dunn, 1996).
Traditionally nonprofits have been studied through resource dependence theory (Miller-Millesen, 
2003) and have focused on the link between the organisation and its environment, particularly how 
organisations attract critical physical and intellectual resources. While this framework may suit 
many non-profit organisations, due to Entré’s unique circumstances, it makes it exceedingly 
difficult to take cultural and historical forces into account due to the short tenure of the management 
team. However, it is still applicable to consider this interaction with a wide array of external forces,
suggesting a responsibility is required to more than just the principals and agents. Companies with 
poor stakeholder performance may find it difficult to acquire necessary support and resources for 
continued operation (Alam, 2006).
Due to Entré’s management team being able to satisfy the interests of stakeholders without 
detrimental effects to any other group, the Stakeholder Salience model is not applicable, as no 
ranking system is needed. Stakeholder-agency theory suggests that in satisfying claims made by 
stakeholders, the amount of resources available to managers to increase growth through 
diversification is diminished. This, however, is not evidently one of the goals of the organisation or 
management, and due to the close alignment of goals the amount of monitoring needed is 
diminished, satisfied by the Advisory committee meetings. The major concern of stakeholders that 
Entré was losing all organisational memory has been mitigated by the hiring of an administrator.
6. CONCLUSION
This research project contributes to the area of stakeholder-agency theory both practically and 
theoretically. The case study approach has provided a general insight into Entré and its governance, 
accountability and management issues.  This research shows that the annual changeover of the 
executive has impacted the relationships with stakeholders over the years, with poor systems 
exacerbating the handover process. The issues contributed by the Board’s level of commitment have 
been alleviated by the increased support from the University, although the effects of this will not be 
apparent for some time yet.
The stakeholders of the organisation have been identified, with a narrow view being taken by the 
management team and the Board. Due to the closely aligned objectives of each group, no ranking 
system has been required to balance interests according to power, legitimacy or urgency, although a 
certain level of sponsorship must be given to be invited to the Advisory committee. It has been 
shown that when stakeholders are included in the decision-making process, these interests are able 
to be met widely. However, for other companies with larger stakeholder groups this may not be so 
easily achieved The dynamics of having an Advisory committee with more than ten groups present 
would be difficult to maintain and time-consuming to hear all perspectives on matters.
The short-term goals of the stakeholders compared to the long-term benefits Entré is able to provide 
raise a further dilemma. While immediate benefits of the relationship with the University, 
recruitment and media exposure, though the latter could be increased, are felt, it may only be a 
matter of time before the lack of a success story coming through the competitions becomes a 
dividing issue and stakeholders discontinue support.
The limitations of this research include that it cannot easily be repeated in most entities due to 
Entré’s unique circumstances. The limited number of stakeholders means that it is able to balance 
interests quite easily without much compromise, exacerbated by the fact that Entré’s stakeholders 
have similar goals and are not competing for resources. Further, the fact that those interviewed were 
likely to be those that are most involved in Entré, and thus more willing to give their time, may 
influence the results. One of the researcher’s views is biased in terms of already having 
relationships with stakeholders may also have impacted those that were willing and available to be 
interviewed.
Most impacts will be felt by next year’s management team and stakeholder relationships. The 
administrator has worked this year to improve the systems, thus ideally the research would include 
next year’s experiences with those systems. Whilst future team members have been included in this 
research, only their expectations are able to be expressed at this stage. Therefore, future research 
should study Entré over the long-term, discussing whether the issues highlighted vary from year to 
year and what impacts the University and Board’s increased involvement has, as well as the 
administrator. Further, a comparative analysis of Entré and other similar organisations, for example 
Spark in Auckland, would develop the area in more detail.
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